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Introduction
There can be no doubt that the basic objective of
the Taiwanese National Health Insurance (NHI)
is to maximize population health. The funda-
mental task of this publicly accountable agency
is, although not explicitly addressed, to improve
the health of the population and reduce inequal-
ities in health within the population. Devices are
therefore needed to promote appropriate supply
of appropriate quality to the appropriate group of
people. In other words, particular criteria should
be set up to allocate resources to particular uses.
Effectiveness and efficiency, weighted by eq-
uity goals, are thought of as necessary when the
NHI is pursuing its objective. This representation
leads to evidence-based medicine (EBM) and re-
imbursement policies as a guide for realizing the
social benefits. Different allocations of resources
may be judged by how well they achieve gener-
ally agreed-upon measures of social benefit. This
paper argues that EBM and reimbursement poli-
cies are not complete if they are introduced sepa-
rately. The principle of cost-effectiveness analysis
should also be considered.
Why are EBM and reimbursement
policies incomplete?
EBM provides a useful synthesis of current knowl-
edge about effectiveness and a good basis to inform
decision makers about resource allocation. This
is important not only because effectiveness is es-
sential for the improvement of patients’ health,
but also because there can be no room in a “pub-
licly subsidized” health care system for treatments
wthat are not effective. Therefore, we need to kno
rwhich are and which are not effective and fo
which patient groups.
tThe proponents of EBM tend to contend tha
the relative efficacy of the competing interven-
ytions is the best way to choose where the mone
should be spent. This involves a belief that the
fquality and quantity of life will be maximized i
each care provided is proven to be efficacious.
Allocating resources to relatively ineffective care
would be a source of inefficiency. This is also un-
fethical because it unavoidably deprives people o
beneficial health care. Resources should thus be
tconcentrated on where they offer the greates
health improvements. Any care that brings pa-
rtients greater health gains should acquire a highe
priority.
However, EBM can be a useful but incomplete
method if clinical effectiveness alone is allowed
wto determine which patients should be, and ho
they are, treated. First, patients’ preference appears
to be different from that of medical professionals.1
yThey may have very different willingness to pa
to have their life prolonged or shortened from the
physician’s perspective. If treatment decisions are
dominated by best evidence of clinicians’ beliefs,
a rational evidence-based intervention can turn
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out to be inappropriate, wasteful and futile. In
this case, we may need an indicator that incorpo-
rates patients’ opinions into consideration, such
as the quality-adjusted life year (QALY), instead
of simple increased life expectancy.
In addition, each health intervention delivered
yields a health improvement and entails a cost.2
The rising costs of health care have been a great
concern in all countries. If all physicians provide
the most efficacious treatments to all the people
who might benefit from them, it may raise, rather
than lower, the cost of their care. The problem is
that the resources a country or individual is pre-
pared to spend on health care provision are fi-
nite. No country, not even the richest, can afford
to carry out all technologically feasible and clini-
cally beneficial procedures that are now avail-
able. The gap between what is possible and what
is affordable is therefore widening. Failure to ac-
knowledge this can lead to inefficiencies and in-
equities that compromise both objectives. Conflict,
and the need to trade off between effectiveness
and costs, is inevitable, shifting the NHI’s task from
simply increasing effectiveness toward maximiz-
ing health outcomes. Choices have to be made.
As regards reimbursement policy, it involves a
selective use of financial incentives to lead health
care providers to offer desired care, whereby the
NHI can achieve its fundamental goals effi-
ciently. The rationale is twofold. First, financial
returns play a role in the medical care sector, de-
termining professionals’ practice pattern and so
the bulk of resource allocation. If appropriately
targeted, the provision of (all) good practices, such
as those interventions supported by EBM, will be
encouraged. Furthermore, a well-designed reim-
bursement method induces providers to supply
care at the lowest resource costs. This enables the
NHI to afford to provide more patients with more
services of good quality. Taken together, the maxi-
mum societal health improvement can be achieved
subject to resource constraints.
However, cost consciousness in a reimburse-
ment system seems to have attracted greater public
interest, which turns out to be the pressure of con-
trolling medical expenditure to an “affordable”
level. A good example is the introduction of the
prospective payment system (PPS) and global
budget system by the NHI in recent years. Both
yrepresent an explicit attempt to control yearl
medical expenditure and its increase within an
agreed level. Literature has indicated that physi-
fcians appear to reduce costs at the expense o
quality or health gains. Issues thus arise when no
parallel attention is paid to the desired outcome.
wOne is indeed the question of what, and ho
much, health gain is offered to patients under a
particular reimbursement policy, and how these
gains are affected by any change made to this
policy. The other is the question of under which
ycondition would cost incentive outweigh qualit
concern, or more specifically, under which condi-
tion would good practice be too costly and there-
fore “deterred”.
Obviously, without this information, we would
not be able to identify the links between a reim-
bursement system and its final impact on people’s
health. We also would not be able to build ap-
propriate guidance on which physicians rely to
judge whether a service of some effectiveness
yshould be cut against its cost. It is very unlikel
that the single pursuit of the lowest cost objec-
tive can be achieved while at the same time en-
suring that medical benefits offered to patients
remain at an acceptable level. Further, if incen-
tives in the provision of care vary for non-clinical
yreasons and are distorted, the service and qualit
that patients receive, and therefore the distribu-
tion of health across population groups, will also
vary. That is to say, when care is not supplied
based on need, population health will not be
maximized, and resource use is inefficient. This
equally would be a source of inequity and ineffi-
ciency. People who expect that financial incen-
tives can be used to reach all NHI objectives are
bound to be disappointed.
One may argue that well-controlled medical
expenditure would allow more people to access
more health care, and the equity target can then be
attained. However, a national agency should con-
sider more than improved accessibility, but also
yequity of health. That this objective is attained b
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increased accessibility is justified only if the con-
nection between health outcome and increased uti-
lization is established. If the increased use of care
does not involve “approved” effectiveness or is not
of the same quality, we can never be sure if peo-
ple’s health is improved by better accessibility.
Why is cost-effectiveness analysis
necessary?
If all these arguments are accepted, it becomes
explicit that using EBM or reimbursement poli-
cies separately to maximize the health of a popu-
lation is incomplete. So, resource allocation can
no longer simply be a matter of eliminating inef-
fective or costly activities.3 It now has to deal
with the much more contentious efficiency prob-
lem of choosing from a set of effective and effi-
ciently produced interventions, with the notion
that there are insufficient resources to provide all
patients with the best possible treatment. Our
immediate task is, therefore, to establish “worth-
whileness” so as to demonstrate that an interven-
tion does more good than anything else that could
be done with the same resources (written com-
munication; Professor Alan Williams, University
of York). It is here that the techniques of cost-
effectiveness analysis have been developed to
help us identify and make clear one set of criteria
that is useful for deciding among different uses
of scarce resources.
The basic tasks of cost effectiveness analysis
are to identify, measure, value and compare the
costs and consequences of the alternatives being
considered.4 It reflects a common desire to derive
the maximum possible health outcome from each
unit of health care resource available.5 The logic
is straightforward. Efficiency is about ensuring
that the market value of a good or service exceeds
the financial cost of providing it. When we are
advocating greater efficiency, we are advocating
the adoption of two precepts: (1) the costs en-
tailed in pursuing any activity are kept to a mini-
mum; (2) the benefits gained outweigh the costs.6
It is the linkage of costs and consequences of 
activities that cost-effective analysis seeks to esti-
mate and allows us to reach our decision. If pri-
tority was given from a high to a low cost per uni
of benefit, say cost per QALY, overall health gain
would rise and would continue to rise until the
cost per benefit for each possible technology was
brought into equality.7
rIt is often argued that it is immoral to conside
tcosts when making clinical decisions, referring i
to judgment on the worth of people’s lives. The
extension of life, the alleviation of suffering and
ythe improvement in people’s functional capacit
should not be limited by financial consideration.
But the financial cost is simply a proxy for the
real resources, such as physicians, nurses, hospital
facilities and pharmaceutical development and
gproduction, etc., that are consumed in providin
a good or service.2 From the societal perspective,
in the presence of scarcity, resources committed
tto treating one patient will not be used to trea
some other person who might have benefited
from them. The true cost of providing health care
to one patient is thus the forgone benefit which
other patients might otherwise receive in the fu-
ture, namely sacrifices borne by other patients who
did not get treated.1,2,6–10
When so interpreted, not being concerned with
costs equally means ignoring the risk imposed
on others of premature mortality and avoidable
suffering.1 This is evidently immoral and unaccept-
able on the grounds of population health ethics.
tThere has to be some mechanism ensuring tha
the benefits to one patient are greater than the
sacrifices of those who are denied treatment as a
result of every treatment decision. In such a system,
our chance of sacrifice is least; decisions are taken
which overall save more lives,10 in which popula-
tion health will be improved as much as possi-
ble. This is to which being cost-effective intends.
It has also been argued that a physician should
gserve as his/her patient’s perfect agent, doin
everything possible with the available resources.
The typical situation is that physicians have an
obligation to spend more on saving an identified
patient whose life is at high risk when there is
gsome intervention that has a chance of savin
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the person’s life. It is not their duty to take into
consideration the needs of unidentifiable indi-
viduals who might ever seek treatment or might
benefit from treatment, now or in the future. The
general working of the health care delivery sys-
tem is also not their prime concern.
Strictly speaking, on the other hand, the physi-
cian is not only the agent of their patients, but also
the gatekeeper of limited health care resources,
i.e. a multi-agent. In a health care system mostly
financed by the NHI, health care resources are
paid by this national agency. Behind the agency
stands the insured, which means almost all of
us.6 It is also not clear whether any (anonymous)
person who could benefit from an effective treat-
ment would agree to forgo their treatment in order
for identifiable patients to receive an expensive
treatment.7 Therefore, the wellbeing of all affected
parties should count, and everyone should be
treated with the same concern and respect. Once
these responsibilities are acknowledged, physicians
must balance the respective interests of their pa-
tients and other unidentified patients, or more
specifically, they should consider the incremen-
tal health benefit offered to each patient. This ev-
idently requires them to seek, on behalf of all
patients as a whole, the most cost-effective man-
ner to allocate resources. While by so doing, their
patients would not be provided with all best evi-
denced interventions, on aggregate, more health
benefits would be brought to the general public
as a whole.
Discussion and Conclusion
Physicians and the NHI are now becoming more
aware of their need to practise within a health
care system that is necessarily constrained and
restricted by the availability of resources. It high-
lights the potential conflict of interest between 
a physician’s multi-agent roles, particularly after
the introduction of the global budget system.
Furthermore, and more importantly, they must
also be prepared to acknowledge restrictions in
what the NHI can provide. Health care must be
limited to what is of proven value for money.
Many people, possibly including within the NHI
itself, may support the idea that such restrictions
can be greatly alleviated if more resources are
poured into health care. But when more resources
are made available, a mechanism is still needed
to ensure that additional resources will generate
yreal improvements in health rather than simpl
creating rents for those who provide care and con-
tinuing with inefficient resource allocation.7 To
develop a means to decide the highest priority uses
to which these additional resources should be
put is necessary.
It is ethically untenable, however, to leave
physicians in a position of uncertainty when
fpressed to trade off the wellbeing of patients o
different groups during each patient encounter.
tFor example, the global budget system places grea
pressure on providers to control their resource
use without giving clear guidance on how to allo-
cate their budget. Obviously, individual providers,
either practitioners or hospital managers, alone
have no necessary information and expertise to
identify what should be chosen or eliminated
from everyday practice. Some form of collective
solution is required. It may take the form of plac-
ing explicit constraints on a physician’s practises
such that their use of resources would be limited
to cost-effective interventions and a set of clinical
guidelines that recognize cost-effective care.
A good example of this collective solution is
the creation of the National Institute of Health
and Clinical Excellence (NICE; www.nice.org.uk)
in England and Wales. The NICE makes recom-
mendations to the National Health Service re-
garding the medical technologies that maximize
health gain. Cost-effectiveness is a major consid-
eration and health gain is taken as a major maxi-
mand.7 In this setting, physicians can strive to
serve the best interests of their patient population,
while the results of their decisions would still
be cost-effective resource allocation.2 Physicians’
multi-agent roles for both the affected general
public and their patients is therefore fulfilled.
Furthermore, since such a collective solution
governs and limits access to shared resources, its
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consequences are bound to be unfortunate for
someone or other. However, this is inevitable. The
issue becomes how best to minimize its adverse
consequences or how much potential harm we
are willing to accept. Therefore, we need to answer
questions such as where the threshold should be
drawn, whereby we can establish a consensus
about what is effective and affordable. It is appar-
ent that over time, there will emerge a marginal
cost per unit of health benefit beyond which a
technology will not be recommended.7 Both new
and existing treatments can then be examined
and decisions made as to whether, in the context
of what can be afforded, the treatment should
be funded at all, and if so, for which groups of
patients.
In the future, cost-effectiveness analysis should
have an increasingly important role to play in the
decision-making process about the allocation of
resources. Nonetheless, it should not be used as
a means to search for infinite wisdom but an
attempt to set a limit to infinite error. This is in-
evitably controversial, but it does provide a basis
for the intelligent use of limited resources, and
making explicit the trade-offs that were previously
hidden. The practical problem of the NHI is to be
able to establish and apply consistent and accept-
able measures for all the outputs of the NHI that
are of prime concern, and to get them deeply em-
bedded in the clinical consciousness. This needs a
community of users, including both physicians
and patients, of this information who can inter-
pret and use it towards the NHI’s objectives. So
the immediate task is to develop comprehensive
fpartnerships and dialogue across a spectrum o
communities and affected groups. Further educa-
tion, training and research should be undertaken.
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